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ABSTRACT 
 
The overarching theme of this work is the extent to which the damage concept within the law of 
negligence reflects our human and social experience of personal harm and injury – and critically, the 
extent to which the current grammar of negligence law permits it to. My claim is that if the concept of 
damage is a normative one – one itself imbued with ideals of social justice and equality, directed towards 
treating like cases alike – then the law of negligence will treat the human experiences that accompany 
different forms of putative damage as stuff central to the damage enquiry. As I seek to argue here, that 
notion that the damage concept is a normative one, open to new situations in which it can be shown that 
iŶdiǀiduals aƌe left ͚appƌeĐiaďlǇ ǁoƌse off͛, is the stuff of legal myth. Centralising the reproductive tort 
cases which have proved dominant in the theorisation of harm I illustrate how traditional understandings 
of damage as physical hurts and ŵediated thƌough ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of loss haǀe rendered 
irrelevant the psycho-social and practical factors which prove crucial to an enquiry in assessing whether 
individuals are left appreciably worse off. The thrust of the argument is that because the very grammar 
of the damage concept fails to engage ǁith iŶdiǀiduals͛ ďiogƌaphies – the ͞stuff͟ that giǀes ŵeaŶiŶg to 
the harms they have sustained – it iŵpaĐts haƌd Ŷot oŶlǇ oŶ the ͚daŵage͛ ƋuestioŶ as to whether 
particular harms should be embraced within negligence on normative grounds but on the extent to which 
negligence itself can be said to have normative traction capable of delivering results that are fair, capable 
of producing horizontal justice and treating like cases alike.  
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Inescapably the state must sort out from the frenetic bustle of the world what amounts 
to a compensable or remediable injury and what does not.1   
 
How much worse off must one be? An action for compensation should not be set in 
motion on account of a trivial injury. De minimis non curat lex. But whether an injury 
is sufficiently serious to found a claim for compensation or too trivial to justify a 
remedy is a question of degree. Because people do not often go to the trouble of 
bringing actions to recover damages for trivial injuries, the question of how trivial is 
too trivial has seldom arisen directly.2  
 
Law’s conventional approach to regulating bodily interventions has been to consider 
the body as an object of analysis rather than as a category of analysis. In our view, 
legal analysis could offer a richer understanding of law’s engagement with bodies 
and bodily materials if it adopted a thicker conception of embodiment.3  
 
Introduction 
The overarching theme of this work is the extent to which the damage concept within 
the law of negligence reflects our human and social experience of personal harm and 
injury – and critically, the extent to which the current grammar of negligence law 
permits it to. My claim is that if the concept of damage is a normative one – one itself 
imbued with ideals of social justice and equality, directed towards treating like cases 
alike – then the law of negligence will treat the human experiences that accompany 
different forms of putative damage as stuff central to the damage enquiry. Of course, 
it is well known that the tort of negligence does not (and cannot) offer universal 
coverage in responding to harm; not all harms considered harmful in the social world 
translate into legal damage. This is the by-product of a system that inevitably must 
make choices and must possess boundaries to be a system. In itself, the drawing of 
lines is not destructive to the conception of damage being regarded as a normative 
                                                          
1
 JK Lieberman ‘The Relativity of Injury’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1977) 60-73, 63.  
2
 Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Company Limited and others; Johnston v NEI International 
Combustion Limited; Topping v Benchtown Limited; Grieves v F T Everard & Sons and others [2007] 
UKHL 39, para. 8 (per Lord Hoffman); hereafter ‘Rothwell’.    
3
 R Fletcher, M Fox & J McCandless ‘Legal Embodiment: Analysing The Body of Healthcare Law’  (2008) 
16 Medical Law Review 321-345, 321.  
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one,4 even if on view of an isolated case, one might believe the result produced to be 
unfair or arbitrary. Rather, in evaluating whether the damage concept is normatively 
charged, my focus is less on the drawing of lines, but on the substance that guides 
where those lines are and should be drawn. Centralising a range of cases which have 
proved interesting to the courts by virtue of the inherent nature of the harm, this paper 
explores the quality of the account given as to where the boundaries of the damage 
concept are drawn. Analysis of ‘the account’ consists of two intersecting elements. 
First, close attention is paid to the kinds of markers that the courts deploy which give 
sense to what ‘damage’ means – for example, seriousness of injury might be one such 
reason for accommodating some harms but not others; the second element concerns 
the framing of particular harms in this process. As I seek to highlight in this article, 
this latter aspect of the enquiry proves critical in evaluating the normative scope of 
the damage concept. Putative markers such as seriousness, or indeed, being left 
‘appreciably worse off’ can quickly lose their normative potential depending on what 
aspects of a claimant’s harm and experience the law ‘sees’ or is capable of seeing.  
 
In exploring the normativity of the damage concept, my interest is less on those kinds 
of harms that law now recognises but treats restrictively, notably claims involving 
purely psychological damage,5 but on a number of broader situations arising under 
English law which have triggered some extended debate in the courts around the 
question as to whether an actionable legal harm, notably “damage”, has been 
sustained. These cases, which for want of a better term are referred to here as ‘damage 
hybrids’, have the look and flavour of a conventional personal injury but resonate in 
a kind of harm that fails to fit orthodox categories. Because of their hybrid nature, 
courts have struggled to typify the damage sustained. As will be seen, the kinds of 
harms falling within this contentious category arguably reflect aspects of the difficult 
historical trajectory that the psychological damage cases have travelled in order to be 
accommodated within negligence, and for unremarkably similar reasons: the 
situations focused on here possess a strong psycho-social character rather than 
squarely fitting what negligence is said to demand in order to establish the existence 
of damage to persons, notably, physical bodily harm.  
 
The question of whether damage has been sustained at all is clearly a fundamental 
one, not only because this is an essential prerequisite for an actionable claim in 
negligence, but because that question also demands a court to assess what, for the 
purposes of negligence liability, should or should not count as cognisable harm. This 
                                                          
4
 It may be that an action fails for other reasons, such as the absence of other critical ingredients that mark 
out the boundaries of responsibility. In social life while it may seem evident that a very serious harm has 
been sustained, some claims may fail for a range of other, and quite valid reasons including the absence of 
a responsible party to blame, or because the causal link between the breach and the outcome harm cannot 
be established on the balance of probabilities. However, what is of interest here, are those kinds of personal 
harms which struggle to gain attention in negligence by virtue of the inherent nature of the harm itself.  
5
 This category of action has attracted a voluminous literature; for a recent and fascinating exploration of 
the subject, see H Teff Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Legal 
Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009). 
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is, of course, a normative question – and it is the normative capacity of this central 
concept that I come to question here. This is a novel, but critical enquiry. While a 
growing body of legal scholarship creatively deploys the concept of harm as a 
hermeneutic in a range of ways, for exploring the position of typically neglected 
subjects before the law (for example, women and ethnic minorities),6 the potential 
impact of technological and clinical innovation which raises fresh opportunities but 
new risks of harms being caused in novel ways,7 or indeed, the impact of human rights 
on negligence in mobilising constitutionalised forms of harm8 – all areas which 
demonstrate the uncertain and often difficult boundaries of the concept of damage in 
practice - what is missing from this field of inquiry is a critique which speaks in more 
general terms about the concept of damage, its nature and life within the tort of 
negligence.   
 
The absence of that kind of over-arching critique may well reflect how discussion 
around the damage concept remains relatively new legal territory in common law 
jurisdictions.9 That is so for scholarship, as well as the courts.10 Indeed, it would seem 
to be a fairly recent matter that the concept of damage has been added to the panoply 
of practitioner strategies for mounting new and innovative legal challenges. From a 
position where scholars felt able to assert that the question of what amounts to 
‘damage’ seemed ‘self-evident’ or a matter of ‘common-sense’,11 a variety of social, 
technological and clinical norms are serving to generate fresh questions about what it 
means to be harmed. In turn, these push hard at the boundaries of what counts as 
‘damage’ in law. This new genus of claims that seek to ease (or ‘stretch’) the damage 
concept away from the ‘obvious’ prove central to the current paper. These cases 
provide an important opportunity for us to become more thoughtful about damage as 
a concept and the way that it defines the scope and boundaries of negligence itself. In 
cases where ‘damage’ has proved central, courts have been forced to reveal some of 
their analytical cards, at least in defining what constitutes ‘actionable damage’. What 
we see is a stubborn preference for interpreting damage and personal injury as 
narrowly meaning harms sustained physically and bodily, with continued suspicion 
surrounding harms falling short of that – despite these often looking every bit as 
‘concrete’ and ‘serious’ at the point of commission, and just as corrosive (perhaps 
more so in many instances) of life in their consequences. An analysis of the 
                                                          
6
 See for example, J Conaghan, ‘Law, Harm and Redress: A Feminist Perspective’ (2002) Legal Studies, 
22, 319-339; M Chamallas & J Wriggins The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender and Tort Law (New York: 
New York University Press 2010); R Graycar & J Morgan, J The Hidden Gender of Law (Sydney: 
Federation Press 2002); D Scott ‘Injuires without Remedies: Body Polluted: Questins of Scale, Gender and 
Remedy’ (2010) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 121-156.  
7
 V Chico, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims 
Generated by Genetic Technology (Routledge Cavendish 2011).  
8
 D Nolan ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’. (2007) Modern Law Review, 70(1), 59-88. 
9
 M Chamallas, ‘Theorizing Damage through Reproductive Torts’, (2015) JOTWELL 
http://torts.jotwell.com/theorizing-damage-through-reproductive-torts/.  
10
 See the dicta of Lord Hoffman at para 8, above note 2.  
11
 PS Atiyah The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1997); see also David Nolan’s (above n 8) 
discussion which touches upon the question around the analytical attention to the damage concept. 
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assumptions informing such deliberations can tell us much about the extent that law 
connects with our social experience of being human, about the defensibility of the 
lines drawn in establishing what counts as damage and injury, and ultimately, it can 
also tell us about the limits of the law.  
 
How the courts have interpreted concepts of damage and injury in assessing which 
kinds of harms may or may not be admitted is undoubtedly problematic, particularly 
when viewed with the benefit of exploring the social and psychological experience of 
injury. But the significance of what that means for the tort of negligence as a fair and 
principled arbiter of what ought to count as damage, is the particular focus. As I seek 
to argue here, that notion that the damage concept is a normative one, open to new 
situations in which it can be shown that individuals are left ‘appreciably worse off’, 
is the stuff of legal myth. My legal lab for analysis consists of a range of cases, in 
particular the expanding category of the reproductive torts which has proved dominant 
in the theorisation of harm as played out through case law and debated in scholarly 
and practitioner communities. Through these cases, what I seek to illustrate is how 
traditional understandings of damage as consisting of essentially physical hurts, 
mediated through ‘common sense’ understandings of loss have rendered irrelevant the 
psycho-social and practical factors which prove utterly crucial to an enquiry in 
assessing whether individuals are left appreciably worse off. The thrust of the 
argument is that because the very grammar of the damage concept fails to engage with 
individuals’ biographies – that is the very “stuff” that gives meaning to the harms they 
have sustained – it impacts hard not only on the ‘damage’ question as to whether 
particular harms should be embraced within negligence on normative grounds but on 
the extent to which negligence itself can be said to have normative traction capable of 
delivering results that are fair, capable of producing horizontal justice and treating like 
cases alike.  
 
What Counts as Damage 
Unlike the torts of trespass or libel which are actionable per se, in the law of 
negligence, ‘damage’ holds a central role and is said to form the ‘gist of the action’.12 
A claimant not only needs to establish a duty of care, a breach of that duty, and that 
the breach has caused the damage complained of – she must also show that the type 
of harm she has suffered is one that is accepted by the law as ‘actionable’. While the 
concept of ‘damage’ is poorly defined in negligence, the suffering of a ‘plain and 
obvious physical injury’ presents no problem.13 Therefore, gastroenteritis suffered 
through swallowing parts of a snail in a bottle of ginger beer or cancer suffered 
through exposure to asbestos in the workplace, will most certainly constitute physical 
harms for the purposes of negligence.14 Yet beyond these so-called ‘obvious’ items, 
                                                          
12
 J Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence’ (1988) The Law Quarterly Review, 104, 213-38, 213.  
13
 PS Atiyah The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1997), 94. 
14
 C Witting ‘Physical Damage in Negligence’ (2002) Cambridge Law Journal. 61(1), 189-208.  
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what constitutes an actionable injury becomes more complex. Defined under section 
38(1) of the Limitation Act 1980, ‘personal injuries’ include ‘any disease and any 
impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition’ (my emphasis). Conceivably, 
while that definition of personal injury could support an expansive accommodation of 
mental harms, in practice the kind of injuries that trigger actionable claims in 
negligence reveals a less liberal reading. It is well known, for example, that emotional 
harm, which falls short of psychiatric illness (such as mere anxiety, inconvenience or 
discomfort) is never actionable, while a medically verified psychiatric illness is only 
actionable under limited circumstances. It is important to note however, that providing 
damage has been established (notably, of the physical sort), that negligence has no 
problem in addressing intangible harms, such as psychological or emotional harms as 
items of consequential loss for the purposes of damages. The distinction though 
muddy at times, is that ‘damage’ concerns liability and is a crucial anchor for an 
actionable claim, whereas items of consequential loss are only relevant for the 
assessment of damages, once liability has been established. With one exception in the 
field of human harms, notably the restrictive category of purely psychological damage 
cases which are only cognisable (and for which a duty is owed only) under highly 
circumscribed conditions, consequential loss cannot frame the damage itself. 
Arguably, given that for those limited purposes psychological damage is treated as a 
form of personal injury this rather blurs the distinction between what are supposed to 
be separate analytical categories (‘damage’ and ‘consequential loss’), as well as 
confusing the issue as to whether damage is genuinely the narrow category that courts 
present it as being. Notwithstanding this anomaly, which according to Abraham 
constitutes a rare exception to the legal requirement for physical harm15 the courts 
have been more explicit in demarcating between these analytical categories in 
defining the limits of the concept of damage in Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating 
Co Ltd.16  
 
In Rothwell, the appellants had been negligently exposed to asbestos at work and 
developed asymptomatic pleural plaques. While pleural plaques indicated the 
presence of asbestos fibres in the lungs and plaura which could cause other life-
threatening diseases (e.g. asbestosis or mesothelioma), these constituted future risks 
which might never materialise. Central to the appellants’ case sat two key arguments; 
the first was that the pleural plaques should be treated in and of themselves as 
actionable harm; the second argument proposed a novel form of actionable damage 
based on aggregation theory – actionable damage it was argued, consisted of the 
combination of the asymtomatic pleural plaques, the risk of future injury as well as 
anxiety at the prospect of future injury. In response to the first argument, although 
physical changes had occurred, notably pleural plaques, it had been found that these 
had no perceptible deleterious effect on the health or capability of the men. In light of 
this, Lord Hoffman rejected asymptomatic pleural plaques as actionable damage, 
commenting that,  
                                                          
15
 KS Abraham ‘The Trouble With Negligence’ (2001) Vanderbilt Law Review, 54, 1187-1223. 
16
 Rothwell (note 2).  
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Damage in this sense is an abstract concept of being worse off, physically or 
economically, so that compensation is an appropriate remedy. It does not mean 
simply a change in physical condition, which is consistent with making one better, as 
in the case of a successful operation, or with being neutral, having no perceptible 
effect upon one’s health or capacity.17 
 
The argument that these physical changes should be regarded as a personal injury, as 
actionable damage in and of themselves, was by far, the most promising.18 For these 
men’s claims, it probably constituted the critical hook for any subsequent recovery of 
what would otherwise be deemed, consequential effects. Nevertheless, insofar as the 
court considered these physical changes in themselves non-actionable, it was perhaps 
unsurprising that their Lordships went on to reject the remaining arguments based on 
aggregated theory. In light of an established position in English law that neither the 
risk of injury or apprehension of that risk happening is actionable, the aggregated 
theory simply amounted to an attempt to repackage different non-actionable 
ingredients (the pleural plaques, risk of future injury and anxiety about risk of future 
injury) to create a new cause of action where none individually could lie. In similar 
force, their Lordships also unanimously rejected the further claim brought on a 
separate appeal19 to the effect that psychiatric injury resulting from anxiety in 
contemplation of the risks flowing from pleural plaques should be deemed actionable.  
 
Central to our current analysis however, is what constitutes ‘damage’ and what kinds 
of human harms are drawn within the judicial frame in establishing its boundaries. 
Importantly, not only is no reference is made to emotional harm as a form of damage 
– indeed, it is explicitly rejected in the face of somewhat creative attempts of lawyers 
to ‘tie’ emotional harms with ‘physical changes’ to push existing boundaries. 
Emotional harms remain, as Rothwell illustrates, a form of consequential loss for 
which one must first establish prior physical damage. Other than the narrowly 
circumscribed situations where claimants can demonstrate that a duty of care exists to 
protect them from purely psychological harm, anything short of that, claimants must 
demonstrate the prior existence of a physical injury ‘hook’ for emotional harms to be 
recoverable.20 The line between physical and emotional harms, however, is not always 
easy to discern. As Conaghan and Mansell comment, ‘physical injury is often 
accompanied by emotional distress while psychiatric harm is regularly exhibited 
through an array of physical symptoms (such as vomiting, insomnia, weight loss and 
                                                          
17
 Ibid, para. 16, para. 7.   
18
 Note also that in the context of the pleural plaques litigation that while Rothwell determined that 
asymptomatic pleural plaques did not constitute an actionable personal injury, and this certainly also 
applied to Scotland and Northern Ireland, both the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly have 
subsequently legislated to reverse it. Following AXA General Insurance Ltd & Ors v Lord Advocate & Ors 
[2011] U.K.S.C. 46, which upheld the right of the Scottish Parliament to reverse Rothman in Scotland, the 
question of whether asymptomatic pleural plaques constitute a personal injury/actionable damage, is now 
jurisdiction specific 
19
 Grieves (note 2).    
20
 Stapleton, The Gist (note 12).  
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other ‘stress related’ illnesses)’.21 While medicine and science illustrate the ‘close and 
symbiotic relationship between mental and physical health’, the distinction between 
these categories nevertheless remains ‘deeply embedded in the doctrinal substance of 
negligence law’.22 Nor is it always clear whether actionable damage has been suffered 
in cases which hold an evident physical and bodily dimension. In Rothwell the House 
of Lords determined that asymptomatic pleural plaques caused by negligent exposure 
to asbestos were insufficient to constitute actionable damage in negligence. 
Undoubtedly, the impact of exposure to asbestos had had some physical impact, but 
not sufficient to constitute actionable damage. Clarifying that the question was not 
whether plaques were an ‘injury’ or a ‘disease’ as the judge at first instance had 
thought, Lord Hoffman noted that the damage enquiry entails asking “Is he 
appreciably worse off on account of having plaques?” Given that the plaques have no 
effect on the health or capabilities of the men, he concluded that ‘they have not caused 
damage’.23  
 
These are not straightforward distinctions being drawn. The resulting dialogue acts to 
mask a process which entails a significant amount of discretion in determining 
whether these injuries, if indeed they were injuries,24 made the claimants ‘appreciably 
worse off’.  This is a far more arbitrary exercise than it might at first appear, given 
that much of what can be said to be deleterious about a physical state, is psychological 
and subjective. Pain, for example while having physiological dimensions has psycho-
somatic ones too; it is also a ‘social and cultural phenomenon’.25 As such, that the 
physical and non-physical dimensions are so thoroughly intertwined, seeking out an 
‘objective’ measure of what is an inherently deleterious physical state and what is not, 
seems doomed from the outset. As Lord Hope in Rothwell recognised, other than 
being able to say that the law will not entertain claims for damages ‘where the physical 
effects of injury are no more than negligible’, policy does not ‘provide clear guidance 
as to where the line is to be drawn between effects which are and are not negligible’.26 
Nevertheless, one quickly gets the sense that their Lordships are incredibly unsure 
about where the distinction between harmful physical states and unharmful ones lie 
with the result that the deployment of language is (understandably) less than artful as 
they attempt to manover themselves through a semanic minefield of closely related 
terms. The attempt to separate out legal concepts of ‘injury’ and ‘damage’ from their 
                                                          
21
 J Conaghan and W Mansell The Wrongs of Tort (London: Pluto Press 1999), 35. 
22
 Ibid.   
23
 Rothwell (note 2), para. 19. For more detailed analysis of this case, see A Gore ‘What is Actionable 
Injury? The Demise of the Pleural Plaques Litigation’ (2008) Journal of Personal Injury Law, 8(1), 1-15; 
G Turton ‘Defining Damage in the House of Lords’ (2008) Modern Law Review, 71(6), 987-1014.  
24
 At points the judgment makes for quite painful reading. As Gore (note 23) comments, it is not clear 
whether the court, and in particular Lord Hoffman, is suggesting that pleural plaques consistute a non-
actionable injury, or whether he is saying that they are not an injury at all, or whether ‘he is sidestepping 
the dichotomy’. All that is clear is that they do not, in and of themselves, when asymptomatic, constitute an 
actionable injury.    
25
 M Winance, ‘Pain, Disability and Rehabilitation Practices: A Phenomenological Perspective’ (2006) 28 
Disability and Rehabilitation 1109-1118, 1110.  
26
 Rothwell (note 2), para. 47.  
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social meaning most evidently proved too challenging for the court, in light of judges 
speaking of the same phenomena as not constituting an injury, constituting a harmless 
injury, potentially constituting an injury, or indeed, damage as something which 
admits of degrees, ‘real damage’ as distinct from damage that is purely minimal.27 
While the thrust of it would seem to be that the physical condition needs to be 
inherently harmful, rather than trivial, this broader conceptual muddle coupled with 
the court’s rejection that damage needed to hinge upon establishing the presence of a 
clinically verifiable injury or disease,28 leaves one with the distinct feeling that the 
judges are just making things up as they go along.  
 
That a clinically verifiable disease or injury is not a prerequisite for the damage 
enquiry undoubtedly works to the favour of that category of claimant who becomes 
unexpectedly pregnant as a result of failures in family procedures which were 
designed to prevent that very result. The so-called ‘wrongful conception’ suit 
illustrates the interpretive scope of the ‘physical damage’ requirement, as well as some 
tensions around whether a pregnancy, though socially regarded as being a ‘natural’ 
and frequently desired state (but also frequently undesired), can be conceptualised as 
harmful. In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,29 for instance, the appellants had 
invited the House of Lords to find that the processes of conception, pregnancy and 
birth were natural events, and could not be deemed a personal injury. Though 
accepting that an unwanted pregnancy could constitute a personal injury given that 
this was the very event the claimant sought medical assistance to avoid, the House’s 
discussion as to how pregnancy is actually injurious, and how this accords with 
conventional understandings of damage, led to a strained and unconvincing set of 
judicial responses. Lord Steyn for example, commented that it was unnecessary to 
consider: 
 
[T]he events of an unwanted conception and birth in terms of ‘harm’ or ‘injury’ in its 
ordinary sense of the words. They were unwanted and known... to be unwanted 
events. The object of the [procedure] was to prevent them from happening.30  
 
Lord Hope, by contrast, considered that the mother’s claim could be described in 
‘simple terms’ as one ‘for the loss, injury and damages which she has suffered as a 
result of a harmful event’ although noted that it ‘may seem odd to describe the 
conception as harmful’.31 His Lordship commented that in normal circumstances this 
would not be the case as the ‘physical consequences to the woman of pregnancy and 
                                                          
27
 Rothwell (note 2), para. 39 (per Lord Hope).  
28
 Though note Lord Scott’s rather contradictory dicta which places quite some emphasis on the absence of 
disease in this case.  
29
 In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, the House of Lords determined that while 
claimants bringing negligence suits involving the wrongful conception of healthy children could claim 
damages for the pain and suffering attendant upon pregnancy and birth, that the law would no longer 
provide compensation relating to the (often substantial) maintenance costs of such (healthy) children.  
30
 Ibid, 74.  
31
 Ibid, 86.  
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childbirth are, of course, natural processes’; however, in these circumstances, ‘it was 
the very thing which she had been told would not happen to her’.32 Refusing to take 
account of any possible ‘relief and joy’ after childbirth, Lord Hope observed that 
‘pregnancy and childbirth involve changes to the body which may cause, in varying 
degrees, discomfort, inconvenience, distress and pain’. The fact that these 
consequences flowed naturally from the ‘negligently-caused conception’ would not 
remove them from the proper scope of an award of damage. Also rejecting the ‘natural 
not injurious’ proposition, Lord Steyn remarked that ‘the negligence of the surgeon 
caused the physical consequences of pain and suffering associated with pregnancy 
and childbirth. And every pregnancy involves substantial discomfort’.33 In similar 
vein, Lord Clyde suggested that natural as the mechanism may have been, ‘the reality 
of the pain, discomfort and the inconvenience of the experience cannot be ignored. It 
seems to me to be a clear example of pain and suffering such as could qualify as a 
potential head of damages’.34  Even Lord Millett, having commented that conception 
and childbirth were the ‘price of parenthood’ thereby dissenting from awarding 
damages under this head, found no difficulty in conceptualising pregnancy in these 
circumstances as a harm: ‘This was an invasion of her bodily integrity and threatened 
further damage both physical and financial.’ In his view, the injury and loss was one 
of personal autonomy and the decision to ‘have no more children is one the law should 
respect and protect’.35 A striking feature of the dicta arising in McFarlane is that 
despite their Lordships’ firm acceptance of an unwanted pregnancy as actionable 
damage, we are presented with a variety of models of personal injury rather than a 
unitary vision as to what that injury precisely consists of. Is the damage based on the 
mental attitude of the claimant, the physical experience, or something else? The 
typification of damage in McFarlane forwards three distinctive models of 
conceptualising personal injury. Though it is clear in all these accounts that 
deleteriousness is necessary to satisfy the ‘damage’ criteria, it remains unclear for the 
purposes of thinking beyond this case to other kinds of harm, whether a claimant must 
always manifest a physical, bodily harm and the criteria by which this is actually 
judged.  
 
Notwithstanding these legal wrangles, the presence of a physical, bodily harm remains 
the gold standard of ‘damage’ in negligence. At the level of common sense, the 
preference for physical bodily harm seems incredibly persuasive. Few of us, it is to 
be imagined, would regard the impairment or loss of a previously well-functioning 
limb as a good thing. The preservation of our bodily integrity seems to be a 
fundamental interest indeed. In the ordering of our human needs and interests, 
Abraham Maslow and Joel Feinberg are united in thinking that such physical 
invasions would be seen as deleterious for reducing an individual down to the very 
lowest level of being: a merely physiological state. The attainment of a stable identity 
                                                          
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid, 81.  
34
 Ibid, 102.  
35
 Ibid, 114.  
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or ‘homeostasis’, a constant and normal physiological state permits the individual to 
transcend ones physical self, ‘one’s own skin and body and bloodstream... so that they 
become intrinsic to the Self itself’.36 And for such theorists, the satisfaction of one’s 
basic physiological needs is critical for the individual to pursue other social goals; so 
the significance of such an invasion of bodily integrity is that the frustration of or 
thwarting of physiological needs prevents the individual from pursuing other goals, 
as until gratified, they will ‘dominated the organism’.37 No doubt, for the ‘organism’ 
to be solely occupied with physiological matters must be a rather bad thing indeed; 
and Feinberg sees the matter in such terms also; for him the blocking or damaging of 
one’s physiological needs features as the most serious of invasions, the person in 
question who sustains that damage would be ‘very seriously harmed indeed’.38 At 
intuitive level, we simply know this to be true; being able to take one’s body more or 
less for granted (quite irrespective of what one’s existing physical state is), rather than 
being conscious of, and consumed by one’s physicality all the time, is what is best 
captured by bodily integrity. It is a sense of self, a stable platform for pursuing one’s 
plans, than an actual descriptor of our physicality.  
 
On this account, that the damage concept accommodates physical bodily harms might 
seem thoroughly unproblematic. But the difficulty here is that it is not simply an 
accommodation, but a relatively exclusive preference for harms of the physical bodily 
kind. The significance of this is that the damage concept acts as a critical gateway to 
the bringing of an actionable claim, and irrespective of the magnitude and extent of 
the losses that one might suffer, should those flow from the kinds of harms which fail 
to ‘fit’ the damage category, those losses will simply lie where they fell. As Turton 
comments,  
 
As a system of corrective justice, the tort of negligence operates to correct wrongful 
losses. This clearly necessitates a loss caused by wrongdoing, but also leaves scope 
for the law only to intervene in those losses that are considered to go beyond what 
everybody is expected to tolerate within everyday life’.39  
 
It is at this point, the boundary between actionability and non-actionability, where the 
operation of the damage concept becomes objectionable. It is an exclusive and 
excluding category that acts as the gatekeeper for financial reparation. It privileges 
and ‘sees’ particular kinds of harm which feel intuitive and through privileging them, 
excludes others. As such, while there is no problem in saying that generally a duty of 
care will be owed for a more than negligible physical injury which results from a 
positive act of a defendant, in relation to psycho-social harms such a thing cannot be 
said. In light of this we should treat with special caution the seemingly normative 
assertions of the courts that actionable damage encompasses harms which are 
‘serious’, leave claimants ‘appreciably worse off’, given that a whole catalogue of 
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ways that one can suffer serious harm or be left appreciably worse off are excluded. 
The kind of harm matters, and insofar as the law has general anxieties about the 
character of psycho-social harms and holding defendants liable for these, no matter 
how serious or disabling the harm that results and how careless the defendant, 
claimants will struggle to gain reparation for their loss. While there are established 
instances where purely psychological harm is treated as damage,40 the courts restrict 
the liability situations via the concept of duty. As such, if psychological harm is a kind 
of damage, it is tenaciously guarded and ring-fenced. Though conceptually capable of 
embracing a broader understanding of what ‘damage’ means, far beyond physical 
bodily trauma, the law of negligence eyes with suspicion harms which manifest 
themselves not as bodily abnormalities, but as psycho-social tragedies.  
 
Before moving on, given that my claim is that a whole repertoire of human 
experiences relevant for a normatively charged concept of damage are treated as 
irrelevant, it is important to flesh out what is meant by psycho-social harm and to 
show its potency for ‘anchoring’ damage. It is much broader than emotional harm in 
the sense of upset, grief or even a clinically verified psychological disorder. Rather, 
what it captures a range of things which, like breaking one’s leg whilst skiing or 
developing a terminal illness, are experiences we would wish to avoid for they are so 
disruptive of life as to completely destabilise it. From the loss of a loved one, caring 
for a sick and elderly relative, the labour of caring for a child that one did not want, 
living in fear in a crime-ridden area, having too much work to do so that one’s social 
and personal life is compromised, to not having enough money to pay the bills – all 
of these are experiences which in a strict sense, fail to be bodily or physical, though 
each of them are mediated through us as persons possessing bodies. Such events and 
experiences are, of course, very often experienced as the vicissitudes of life. But whilst 
they endure they can prove to be psychologically and socially corrosive in their 
impact. They all relate to our emotional being in the world, and our connections and 
relationships with others, with our responsibilities and moral sense of responsibility 
to others. They have a physical and emotional dimension insofar as they can result in 
declines in physical and mental health, but often imperceptibly and gradually; they 
often require entail hard work, both physically and emotionally in supporting others. 
Many of these can be regarded as chosen situations, but morally and structurally they 
will feel unavoidable and unauthored. All of these kinds of experiences are part of the 
package of life, but for as long as they endure they keep us standing in the same spot. 
They can disable us. It is in this important sense that these experiences fail to differ 
from the experience of a physical injury in terms of the meaning of our lives and 
interference with the things we most value. If one considers the effects of dealing with 
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a broken leg, the significance of that physical injury lies in its psycho-social effects; 
one suffers pain, has to reorganise how to get around, cannot engage in sports or 
walks, and must endure the hassle of scans and eventually getting a cast removed – 
many aspects of one’s daily life simply need to be rethought and the kinds of simple 
everyday events we could normally take for granted, become the stuff of rethinking 
and re-evaluation. With this in mind, we start to see how the assumption that physical 
harms are different in nature from other kinds of harms looks rather artificial indeed. 
What is harmful about a physical harm is situated not in the momentary fracture of a 
physical structure, but in its human effects. On this analysis at least, if we think about 
the precise way that any of these events might interfere with our lives, our goals and 
aspirations, there seems to be no theoretical basis for calling one set of experiences 
‘life’ and another ‘injury’ (or indeed, following Rothwell, ‘harmful injuries’ rather 
than ‘injuries that are harmless’41). It is the strength of that demarcation and the 
disconnection between the two that is at issue here.  
Hybrid Injuries and Failed Reproductive Wishes 
The question as to what aspects of our humanity the law manages to capture and the 
extent to which it reflects our experience of injury, is the normative hermeneutic 
suggested here. If one reads through any personal injury case, one will be struck by 
the highly specified way that injury is represented. Law’s narrative of humanity, if 
taken as something that represents persons offers a mightily simplified and stripped 
down biography of the events around the commissioning, sustaining and 
consequences of an injury. Victims really don’t look remarkably human at the end of 
a case. So too, for that matter, do defendants become faceless individuals (though 
given that much of tort law is handled by insurers, this is probably much closer to the 
truth). Much of what it means to be human is filtered out and squeezed through 
analytical categories so that the people central to negligence cases seem like quickly 
drawn caricatures of human beings. Of course, to some extent this is unavoidable; 
socially and individually we are complex. Given that those closest to us can be 
surprised at the twists and turns in our personalities, we can hardly expect the law to 
capture what it means to be ‘us’ at this level. However, insofar as negligence law 
relates to the regulation of real human beings, in the setting of duties, standards and 
the provision of a response for negligently inflicted injury, it is quite reasonable to 
suppose that determinations as to what amounts to a compensable injury and what 
does not, would be informed by reference to the social experience of injury.  Indeed, 
an evaluation of the ‘effects’ (beyond ‘physical’ effects) goes to the heart of the 
question as to whether a putative harm is seen as sufficiently injurious, or indeed, 
whether a claimant has been left ‘appreciably worse off’ for it to be embraced within 
the concept of damage.  
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As a means of thinking this through, the focus for this query is upon a relatively new 
type of injury situation, which I have referred to elsewhere as the “Hybrid Injury”.42 
The central feature of the hybrid injury is that the nature of the harm, which holds 
psycho-social and practical dimensions, sits somewhere in between two strong and 
recognised forms of damage in negligence law: firstly, the conventional personal 
injury case which involves physical bodily harm, and secondly, that of the purely 
psychological damage via ‘nervous shock’ situation, in particular, where a primary 
victim sustains psychiatric trauma as a result of narrowly escaping physical injury.43 
If the purely-psychological-harm-via-shock cases served to constitute the first 
significant assault on the boundaries of the damage concept – in the sense of at least 
easing it away from rigid ideas of the necessity of bodily harm, then these hybrid cases 
may be seen as the second assault. They are excellent candidates for this because of 
their strong familial resemblance to the conventional personal injury case, in all but 
the harm actually sustained. As such, with these hair-splitting cases courts have been 
forced to be more explicit about why it is that the harms sustained constitute damage 
or not. What becomes apparent is the extent of the law’s hostility to and ignorance 
about harm of a psycho-social nature, as well as the striking absence of a sufficient 
conceptual justification for existing legal boundaries. In terms of claims brought to 
date, these include situations which Teff refers to as ‘psychological detriment’ cases, 
or those which Horsey and Rackley refer to as claims for ‘messed up lives’44, notably 
cases in the setting of education and social care which involve alleged failures on the 
part of educational psychologists,45 teachers or social workers in the identification of 
conditions, amelioration of learning difficulties or exercise of appropriate care 
decisions.46 Here, however, my focus is firmly upon reproductive cases which qualify 
as hybrid injury cases given that these have proved quite special in challenging the 
damage concept, and particularly revealing as to the problematic distinctions between 
actionability and non-actionability in English law.  
The Joys of Parenthood 
If the House of Lords’ conceptualisation of the injury of pregnancy, labour and 
childbirth in McFarlane47 was problematic, this lay in the representation of these 
events as being episodic and isolated. This had very particular repercussions in the 
context of the broader claim, where the pursuers48 sought damages not only for the 
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pain, suffering and lost amenity attendant upon pregnancy and childbirth, but for the 
maintenance costs of raising the resulting healthy child. While allowing damages for 
the former, the House of Lords unanimously denied the child maintenance claim 
though deploying a variety of techniques in reaching this conclusion. Lords Hope and 
Slynn typified the harm sustained as purely economic loss. In severing the child 
maintenance claim from the duty of the doctor to prevent pregnancy no justification 
was provided as to why a doctor should be liable for the economic loss flowing from 
pregnancy and childbirth, but not its repercussions. Although a distinction which Lord 
Millett found artificial ‘if not suspect’ given that these events were the very things the 
defendants ‘were called upon to prevent’,49 his view that pregnancy, childbirth and 
the raising of the child were ‘the price of parenthood’,50 appears equally suspect. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion led him to reject such awards, and offer as compensation 
a small award of £5,000 to reflect their loss of freedom to limit their family size. 
Notwithstanding all of these approaches, in what has become the most quoted passage 
of McFarlane, Lord Steyn captures the sentiments which resonate throughout each 
judgment. Concluding that recognising such a claim would be contrary to the moral 
ethos of society, he argued:  
 
Instinctively, the traveller on the Underground would consider that the law of tort has 
no business to provide legal remedies consequent upon the birth of a healthy child, 
which all of us regard as a valuable and good thing.51  
 
The McFarlane decision certainly invites a far broader critique than can be provided 
here,52 for so many aspects of this judgment remain questionable. From the 
typification of the consequences of a failed medical procedure sought to remove the 
prospect of parenting responsibilities as a ‘joy’ or a ‘good thing’, the fact that women 
will be particularly affected by decision-making in this area given that the burden of 
care continues to fall more often than not, upon women, to the messy and 
contradictory application of legal ‘principle’ so that one wonders what legal principle 
remains - there is little to commend the judgment. However, what concerns us here is 
the way that law engages with our humanity; and in this respect, the artificial split 
between the events of pregnancy, childbirth and the events which have been typified 
not as capable of amounting to damage but rather, purely economic harm, or a ‘good 
thing’, is the issue. Quite critically, such a divorce between these ‘events’ is only 
possible by virtue of an understanding of reproductivity and reproductive labour that 
fails to connect with our human experience. And in line with the running thesis of this 
piece, the problematic priority afforded to physical harm as the gold standard of 
‘damage’ is what sustains that failure to connect with the experience of injury.  
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The manner by which pregnancy, labour and childbirth were typified, as we saw 
earlier, presented the harm as an invasion of the fundamental right to bodily integrity 
– a depiction which Hale LJ (as she was then) later criticised for offering an account 
of those events without any ‘detail about what is entailed’.53 Significantly, while these 
accounts of injury are premised upon the traditional tort framework which prioritises 
physical bodily harms, in treating bodily boundaries as something to be protected from 
outside invasion, how do these fail to capture the experience and impact of an 
unwanted pregnancy? Is not a pregnancy significant for being more than a physical 
and biological event? While the House of Lords rejected child maintenance damages, 
thereby severing the harm at the point of birth, does this not posit the harm as 
peculiarly episodic and fleeting, rather than what must be perceived in these cases as 
an enduring responsibility?  
 
Female personhood in pregnancy cannot be understood by reference to the merely 
biological and physical, as these ‘processes are always mediated by the cultural 
meanings of pregnancy, by the woman’s personal and social context, and by the way 
she constitutes herself in response to these factors through the decisions she makes’.54 
Although rooted in biology, the significance of pregnancy – whether experienced as 
a wanted or unwanted state – cannot be appreciated by focusing on the physical 
manifestation of pregnancy. Rather, the significance of being pregnant is inextricably 
intertwined with the considerable respnosibility and enduring consequences which 
pregnancy heralds. For a woman, her expectations of life, her stability, her security, 
her hopes for the future have been irrevocably changed by virtue of that physical state. 
Furthermore, an unwanted pregnancy can seriously disrupt important aspects of a 
woman’s  life, including family relationships, work, education, and finances, which 
may result in enduring demands and burdens on her life.55  Significantly none of these 
are corporeal harms. Only when we acknowledge both the physical and psycho-social 
aspects, can we begin to address the extent of the harm of an unwanted pregnancy. 
And this will never be a merely physical event that ceases at childbirth. For many 
women, this may be viewed as an enduring, continuing source of responsibility and 
connection – a process that has a beginning, but no end.  
 
Insofar as these wrongful conception cases provide a stark illustration of the 
operational problems inherent in the traditional personal injury framework, this has 
not gone unnoticed at judicial level. Ruminating on the McFarlane decision, Hale LJ 
argued that the birth of a child was an inseparable consequence of the harm of 
unwanted pregnancy, so that it ‘is not possible, therefore, to draw a clean line at the 
birth’.56  Noting (in detail) that while pregnancy is more significant than a merely 
‘physical’ event, but involves a ‘severe curtailment of freedom’, she comments that,  
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Parental responsibility is not simply or even primarily a financial responsibility.  The 
primary responsibility is to care for the child. The labour does not stop when the child 
is born. Bringing up children is hard work. The obligation to provide or make 
acceptable and safe arrangements for the child's care and supervision lasts for 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, all year round, until the child becomes old enough to take 
care of himself. That is why the 'mother gap' exists: mothers have to tailor their work 
outside the home to cater for their caring responsibilities within the home. Only those 
who can earn more than it will cost to buy some of those services from others suffer 
a much smaller gap. But the cost is still there.57 
 
For Hale LJ, all of these consequences flow ‘inexorably, albeit to different extents and 
in different ways according to the circumstances and characteristics of the people 
concerned, from the first: the invasion of bodily integrity and personal autonomy 
involved in every pregnancy’.58 Conscious of the manner by which this offers a very 
different typification of the harm involved in wrongful conception cases, Hale LJ 
comments that rather than the harm being located in the economic consequences of 
paying for the child’s keep, it is instead located in the care and labour entailed in 
raising the child. While their Lordships had rejected the view that these harms were 
consequential upon the injury in pregnancy and childbirth, Hale LJ nevertheless views 
this as an impoverished way of typifying the harms involved; instead, the loss is best 
expressed as a loss of autonomy, for being an experience which permeates every 
aspect of an individual’s life.  
 
At the time, the present author regarded Hale LJ’s analysis as a ‘conceptual 
metamorphosis’,59 not only in the context of these wrongful conception cases, but in 
offering a deeper and more meaningful approach to how the concept of damage and 
the notion of personal injury might be addressed and conceptualised in negligence. Of 
special importance here is the rejection by Hale LJ of the traditional damage paradigm 
so deeply embedded in negligence. The traditional conception of damage dislocates 
the very meaning of what is injurious about injury for only having meaning in its 
purely physical manifestation so that our focus is skewed, necessitating the search for 
scars, biological evidence of injury, for traces of physical damage which no (rational) 
person would invite, wish for or consent to. From this perspective, it is quite easy to 
see that the very conceptual difficulties that commentators and judges in this field 
have experienced rests upon the fact that neither pregnancy or parenthood are easy to 
describe in these terms, and no doubt most people would be shocked to hear that a 
pregnancy let alone a child were in any way analogous to a fractured skull. Yet, when 
those experienced are unwanted and enforced, they can be every bit as harmful (and 
potentially more so), enduring, and corrosive of one’s autonomy as any physical harm.  
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The Properties of Lost Sperm 
While McFarlane received a fair amount of critical commentary, some might offer 
the view that their Lordships later rescued themselves in the case of Rees v Darlingon 
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust60 in their management of a claim involving a disabled 
claimant who wrongfully conceived a healthy child. In that case, their Lordships were 
invited to review McFarlane. Though stubbornly loyal to the central premise of 
McFarlane, notably that parents should not receive compensation for healthy children 
(these continuing to be good things rather than bad things) by a majority the House 
determined that Lord Millett’s idea of a conventional sum in McFarlane was a ‘gloss’ 
worth deploying here. Creating a ‘conventional award’ to reflect the lost autonomy 
involved in wrongful conception, that loss regarded as consisting of the deprivation 
of living the kind of life one had wanted to lead, the House of Lords sent Karina Rees 
away with what will be a fixed sum in all such cases, of £15,000. Certainly, this is 
something and something is undoubtedly better than nothing. But it does not rescue 
their Lordships from their problematic reasoning in McFarlane given that the 
recognition of lost autonomy is really largely rhetorical. In ordinary cases where 
damage is recognised, damages would be based on a corrective measure of full 
reparation, rather than this symbolic fixed sum which fails to enquire into how 
claimants are affected and what losses they as individual claimants actually sustain. 
As such, the award continues to constitute an exception to the ordinary principles of 
negligence, fails to engage with the nature of the harm sustained in such cases, and 
continues to reaffirm that non-physical harms are far less harmful than physical ones 
and less deserving of a response. On this basis, though there is something radical about 
the Conventional Award in the sense of it appearing to accommodate a broader kind 
of damage than merely physical harms, as it applies to the wrongful conception case, 
it is far from radical at all: it is less of a remedy than a consolation prize for claimants 
whose losses have not been afforded the benefit of proper scrutiny or redress.  
 
Despite these concerns about the wrongful conception case, there was still the chance 
that this approach might yet prove to be significant given that it did signal a quite 
astonishing departure from conventional ways of conceptualising damage. Though 
lost autonomy panned out to be a half-hearted measure potentially designed to placate 
claimants who would still be left holding the baby largely uncompensated, perhaps 
later cases would more fully reveal the promise of the approach. In this respect, a 
strong contender for such an analytical approach was the case of Yearworth and others 
v North Bristol NHS Trust61 in which the claimants had banked semen samples which 
were later negligently destroyed.62 The claimants, all cancer patients, brought claims 
against the NHS Trust for the mental distress and/or psychiatric injury they had 
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suffered upon learning of the negligent destruction of the samples, or the lost 
opportunity to father children having failed to regain their fertility following 
treatment.  
 
That the facts of the case seemed to resonate so strongly with the kind of harm suffered 
by claimants in the wrongful conception case, in the sense of the disruption to their 
idealised private and family lives, this might well have offered a superb opportunity 
to apply the idea of loss of autonomy to a different, though closely analogous situation.  
Yet, in the structuring of the claim by the claimants’ legal representatives, and the 
responses offered at first instance and in the Court of Appeal, there is no mention of 
Rees or the Conventional Award; something made all the more surprising given the 
analytical struggles that lawyers and the judiciary alike had in assessing what kind of 
damage, if any, had actually occurred. At first instance the trial judge accepted the 
arguments of the NHS Trust, who though admitting being in breach of duty, denied 
liability arguing that the men were not entitled to damages because loss of sperm 
neither constituted a ‘personal injury’ nor indeed, damage to their ‘property’. The 
Court of Appeal also rejected that the damage to and loss of the sperm samples 
constituted a ‘personal injury’. However in its broader resolution of the case, the Court 
departed from the first instance analysis. On the issue of property, the Court found 
that for the purposes of their claims in tort, the men had ownership of the sperm; 
furthermore, having asked the parties to make fresh submissions on whether the 
appellants might have a distinct cause of action under the (somewhat archaic) law of 
bailment, the Court also held that there was a bailment of the sperm by the men to the 
Trust. Subject to the factual issues being resolved before the County Court, the Trust 
was liable to them under bailment as well as tort, and the appellants were in law 
deemed capable of recovering damages for psychiatric injury and/or mental distress 
in bailment.   
 
Yearworth constitutes an illuminating example of the narrower reading afforded to the 
personal injury concept in English law. Viewed through a restrictive reading of 
damage where ‘physical’ bodily harm is necessary, the ejaculated sperm would leave 
the men’s bodies in their previous – and unharmed state – a neutral outcome (it would 
be the treatment for cancer that risked rendering the men infertile), so in what way 
could the loss sustained be describable as physical bodily harm? Clearly, Mr 
Townsend, Counsel for the Appellants in Yearworth, faced an uphill battle in 
attempting to demonstrate that the relevant loss (narrowly advanced as the destroyed 
sperm itself), constituted a ‘personal injury’. Conscious of the apparent need to 
present the ‘injury’ as physical and bodily in nature in line with conventional 
understandings of the ‘damage’ in English law, he forwarded a veritable battery of 
arguments which sought to elide the theoretical differences between a physical bodily 
injury and physical damage to bodily materials after removal from the body. In 
attempting to encourage the judiciary to embrace a more ‘elastic’ definition of injury 
so as to encompass this event, Mr Townsend’s argument proceeded as thus: (a) the 
sperm had been inside the men; (b) damage to it while there, for example as a result 
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of radiation of the scrotum, would have constituted a personal injury; (c) why should 
the men’s ejaculation of it make any difference? (d) unlike products of the body which 
are removed from it with a view to their being abandoned – such as cut hair, clipped 
nails, excised tissue and amputated limbs – the sperm was ejaculated with a view to 
its being kept; (e) unlike other parts of the body which are removed even with a view 
to being kept (e.g. such as hair for a memento) the ultimate intended function of the 
stored sperm was identical to its function when formerly inside the body, namely to 
fertilise a human egg; and (f) the sperm retained a significant property; despite being 
frozen, it remained in essence biologically active with the result that it retained a living 
nexus with the men whose bodies had generated it.63  
 
Unable to cite direct authority to support his proposition, Counsel relied upon 
alternative authorities which illustrated a more fluid approach to the question of what 
constituted a ‘personal injury’. His main authorities for such an approach were derived 
from Walkin v South Manchester Health Authority64 and a German Federal Court of 
Justice decision.65 In Walkin, a wrongful conception case, the Court of Appeal had 
accepted that an unwanted pregnancy brought about by clinical negligence in family 
planning techniques could constitute a personal injury and fell within the definition of 
section 38(1) of the Limitation Act 1980.66 However, perhaps more germane to the 
instant case, was the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, decided on similar facts to 
Yearworth in which the Court had treated negligently destroyed sperm as if it were a 
personal injury. On view of such authorities, the Court of Appeal gave Counsel’s 
argument short-shrift. Noting that while a broader approach to personal injury had 
indeed been adopted in Walkin, pregnancy was nevertheless a physical event within 
the woman’s body, thereby the analogy far from aided Counsel’s argument. In relation 
to the specific legal context under which the German Court had laboured at the time 
of giving judgment, their options for permitting recovery, by contrast with English 
law, were severely limited. The only means by which the man could have recovered 
for the damage he had sustained was by classifying the injury as personal.67 Disposing 
of the personal injury element, Lord Judge CJ commented that, 
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[I]t would be a fiction to hold that damage to a substance generated by a person’s 
body, inflicted after its removal for storage purposes, constituted a bodily or 
“personal injury” to him.68   
 
A contrary conclusion, the Court considered, could be productive of counter-intuitive 
results, for example, in cases where the sperm was negligently destroyed after the men 
regained their fertility, or where the time limit for preservation of sperm had been met 
resulting in the intentional destruction of the samples as demanded by law. Yet 
ironically, despite holding it to be a ‘fiction’ to hold that lost sperm could be capable 
of counting as a bodily or personal injury, the Court proceeded to question, and at 
length, whether sperm stored for these purposes could be capable of ownership. 
Conducting a lengthy review of authorities in English law which illustrated great 
reluctance to confer a property or ownership label upon the human body or its parts, 
an analysis of other jurisdictions where courts had debated property in the body, and 
ignoring the warnings of Counsel for the Respondents who was clearly more 
cognisant of the reasons shaping prior judicial restraint, the Court of Appeal 
determined that for the purposes of their claims in tort, the men had ownership of the 
sperm.  
 
In so many ways, while the pages of the Yearworth judgment are exciting for their 
conclusions around property in the body, the judgment is more interesting and 
revealing for what the Court of Appeal failed to explore. In the former instance that 
scholars should come to see the most sensational aspect of the case as being the 
conferring of a property label onto human bodily materials is probably unsurprising. 
Not only has the subject been hotly contested in academic circles across decades, but 
English law itself has rarely created exceptions to a general rule that has denied 
property conceptualisations of the human body or its parts. One might think then, that 
the question as to whether applying the property label in the present case was really 
appropriate might be best addressed by Parliament.69 Yet, the entire judgment was 
utterly overwhelmed by doctrinal and philosophical questions around the nature of 
property and the narrow issue of the susceptibility of sperm to ownership. The evident 
keenness of the Court of Appeal to give some ‘physical’ hook via property by which 
to ground a possible claim however drove them to entirely neglect a question which 
is not, following our analysis of cases like McFarlane or Rees, simply a matter of 
‘common sense’: how and in what way had these men been made ‘appreciably worse 
off’? This is the most interesting aspect of the case and it proves the most important 
in our enquiry around the extent to which the concept of damage is normatively 
charged. While the Court of Appeal located a somewhat controversial physical hook 
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by which to found a private law claim, what we never learn are the reasons as to why 
that step should be taken.  
 
At this stage of our analysis, it is hoped that the reader will be struck by the curious 
manner by which the Courts have interpreted the harms suffered by these parties. 
While Yearworth takes quite a different route by which to conceptualise the damage 
that the men suffer through destroyed sperm, the precise vehicle for this closely 
resembles a personal injury approach insofar as it also collapses into a physical 
paradigm as ‘the’ means of assessing actionability. The damage in this sense consists 
not of the deleterious effects but of the destruction of the (property) sperm. Insofar as 
some might regard Yearworth to be a significant case for challenging traditional 
conceptions of men’s bodies ‘as sexed bodies rather than as reproductive bodies’70  
thereby championing men’s reproductive rights, such a conclusion would be 
somewhat premature. The global picture suggests a hollow victory from this 
perspective.  If we consider more holistically the range of cases assessed here, from 
McFarlane to Yearworth, we see little consistency or coherence in the analysis offered 
by the courts as to why damage is recognised in some cases, and not in others. Instead, 
forms of harm are magically transformed, albeit awkwardly, into personal injury 
(allowing pain and suffering attendant on pregnancy and birth) or purely economic 
loss (denying child maintenance costs of healthy but wrongfully conceived child), 
whilst others are transformed into property damage (to mobilise a claim for destroyed 
sperm in bailment). These actionability transformations permit the courts to get to the 
conclusion they seek to reach, but fail to justify why. This latter step, however, proves 
critical. The enquiry as to ‘why’ some matters become or do not become forms of 
actionable damage would need to be central if the concept of damage possessed a 
normative underbelly. And why a normatively charged concept of damage matters 
proves so crucial is by virtue of providing the judiciary with the methods and social 
imagination to drive a principled, fair and like-for-like incremental development of 
negligence.  
 
This is quite critical insofar as it is far from obvious why lost sperm should count as 
damage, and yet the care and labour of an unwanted child, should not. We can, of 
course, attempt to locate an overarching principle that binds them together, but this 
will not take us very far. It might, for example, be argued that the harm of an unwanted 
child is not universal to all. Given that some people welcome the prospect of a healthy 
child, negligence should hesitate before accommodating context-dependent harms. 
Yet such an analysis also squarely applies to lost sperm; to put it as delicately as one 
can, it might be supposed that a great many men willingly suffer the loss of sperm 
quite routinely rather than experience this as harmful. We may have suspicions as to 
why the courts are better disposed to some cases than others - for example the potential 
financial magnitude of claims - but this does not invoke the analytical category of 
‘damage’ (or even negligence). Rather, unarticulated judicial preferences as to which 
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kinds of harms are harmful and which are not, would then be doing the work. As a 
normative category, the question of why the tort of negligence should encompass 
some kinds of harm is simply missing, or is skewed by virtue of what the damage 
enquiry currently demands that we look for as the central feature of all negligence 
cases: physical loss. And herein lies what is a far deeper problem: as a normative 
category, the damage concept will always be an impoverished means of addressing 
the very query which the House of Lords in Rothwell suggested was so central to 
establishing the presence of damage: notably whether the claimant had been made 
‘appreciably worse off’.  For that, the physical and bodily dimensions of injury will 
never be able to tell us much about loss, harm, deleteriousness or indeed, 
deservingness. Rather, if we care about affording redress for serious instances of loss, 
then as the next section seeks to illustrate, this can only be adjudged by reference to 
what the damage enquiry so ably manages to miss: our embodied human experience 
of injury.  
 
On Being Human: Psycho-Social Aspects of Male Infertility  
For some, the construction of the claimants’ harm in Yearworth as property, rather 
than personal injury, or indeed a broader conception of damage, will be completely 
unproblematic. Property, it might be argued, like any other legal category, is nothing 
but a practical analytical label - one shouldn’t read too much significance into it. For 
others, labels are not legally innocuous or morally neutral but highly symbolic for 
potentially expressing different values about humanity. On this view, the label is far 
more than a practical legal device to mobilise some claim or another – it has the 
capacity to shift the way we see humanity in the future. While some regard ideas of 
property or ownership when applied to bodies or body parts with trepidation for 
commoditising aspects of human life,71 others would welcome this conceptual shift 
for offering potentially stronger rights by which to protect the human body.72 Yet, for 
the present author, the main issue with this label, akin to personal injury, is not on 
what it symbolises, but what it actually does. What both property and personal injury 
concepts share in common is an unshakeably strong focus on corporeal harm as the 
trigger for actionability. On all accounts, this is a perilously reductionist account of 
harm. Insofar as both labels treat psycho-social dimensions of harm as largely 
irrelevant, courts will always be constrained in their ability to properly engage in 
normative questions around whether a particular harm ought to count as damage. In 
other words, issues that are arguably critical for a principled and normative evaluation 
of damage – indeed, negligence itself – are missing.  
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A full reading of the County Court and Court of Appeal management of the Yearworth 
case reveals that the question as to whether damage was suffered was addressed as a 
purely legal analytic exercise. The only question was how destroyed sperm samples 
could fit existing categories of damage by which to ground a claim for damages for 
subsequent loss. The ‘why’ question, however was missing; despite being a novel kind 
of damage, neither court felt it necessary to enquire whether and in what way these 
claimants had suffered an event that left them “appreciably worse off”.73 What we 
learn about any given claimant is the alleged suffering of a ‘severe adverse reaction 
to the news that, unless he was to recover his natural fertility, his chance of becoming 
a father, represented by the storage of his sperm, had been lost’.74 Moreover, the court 
noted some of the features of the case which served to weaken it, one of which was 
that some of the men had since regained their fertility – or had sub-optimal fertility to 
start off with – factors which rendered a set of claims that were likely to be relatively 
modest in damages. Yet across the judgments, no consideration was given as to why 
or whether negligence (or for that matter, bailment) should seek to recognise and 
protect (or not) the kinds of interests which the circumstances of this case revealed. 
Rather, akin to the analysis of harm in McFarlane of which Hale LJ later complained, 
we get the conclusion, but without any ‘detail about what is entailed’.75  
 
Yet this complaint, notably of the absence of ‘detail about what is entailed’, extends 
far beyond the examples set in the context of reproductivity. This problem manifests 
itself at every level in the context of determinations of what counts as damage. The 
foundational nature of the concept of damage and its significance in the context of 
negligence should surely invite forward-thinking shifts in judicial thought that rises 
above the specifics of a case so that incrementalism is directed by normative 
principle.76 Yet what is apparent from cases where ‘damage’ has proved central, the 
specifics of the case prove dominant and have overwhelmed principled analysis. 
However, the example of reproductive harm provides a focused illustration as to how 
that problem operates, and the result: notably, a serious miscasting of how entire 
categories of person are and how harm is really experienced. While men’s 
experiences of reproduction ‘have tended to be seen in law as somewhat distant and 
vicarious, mediated by and through the agency of the woman who stands as a ‘gate-
keeper’ to their involvement’,77 Yearworth does nothing to challenge such a 
conception. The construction of the harm in Yearworth as consisting of destroyed 
property, rather than significant for what that symbolises for those men, skews the 
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harm in significant ways. Rather than focusing on the gravity (or indeed, triviality) of 
the harm suffered, in the sense of what these sperm samples had signified for these 
men in the context of their biographical lives, the focus on property limits our 
understanding of loss as essentially residing in property relations, had and lost.  
 
An analysis of the manner by which the law represents men’s relationship to 
reproduction and fatherhood readily illustrates how men are conceptualised as 
peripheral, if not shadowy characters in the whole matter. Though cases involving 
wrongful conception invite an obvious critique in terms of the way that women are 
represented as essentially maternal, and naturally unharmed by the prospect of 
(unwanted) motherhood, the characterisation of men is equally pernicious. Remarking 
on the belief that a child is a blessing in such cases and the problematic representation 
of women’s labour, Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett suggest that this provides: 
 
[A]n excellent illustration of how easy it is for the law to perceive the financial loss 
to the father who has to provide for an unplanned child, but not to the mother, who 
has to bring [the child] up... The law is not used to conceptualizing the services of a 
wife and mother as labour which is worthy of hire.78  
 
But nor is the law accustomed to conceptualising the harms that men sustain as 
extending beyond loss to the wallet or property.  Indeed, insofar as stereotypical views 
of what it is to be a woman, have harmed women, the same can be said for men.79 
Social understandings of men’s relationship to reproduction as essentially ‘indirect, 
involving supporting mothers in financial, emotion or other ways’, comment Sheldon 
and Collier, ‘have been entrenched in a range of legal provisions’.80 While law’s 
understanding of masculinity reflects a view of the past where men’s lives are 
interesting ‘in their more public dimensions thereby ignoring the private and personal 
elements’,81 in the context of reproductivity, it remains the case that even academic 
literature on men’s experiences of parenthood, reproductivity and inability to parent 
is sparse.82 From the provision of reproductive and maternal services to reproduction 
research, reproduction remains centred on women as if ‘it were central to all women’s 
lives’. Despite male problems constituting the sole or contributing factor to infertility 
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in a substantial proportion of couples,83 and shifting social expectations in respect of 
men’s emotional involvement in family and fathering practices,84 the continued 
conflation of reproduction with femininity, places men in a marginal position as 
‘largely invisible actors’, ‘bystanders’85  and more provocatively, the ‘second sex’. As 
Throsby and Gill note, cultural associations of reproduction ‘with women and the 
focus of reproductive technological intervention of the female body add to the 
invisibility of the male experience of that engagement’.86  
 
Moreover, while research endeavours have moved on from the position that ‘children 
are seen as a woman’s business and events from conception onward her concern’,87 
studies designed to elicit a greater understanding of men’s experience, have been 
constrained by broader factors. For example, while finding that for both men and 
women the inability to conceive a child constituted a major life crisis, resulting in 
feelings of ‘grief, anger, guilt, envy, profound loss and depression’, Throsby and Gill 
also found that the continued (false) correlation between infertility and impotence 
tended to encourage secrecy amongst men, or a tendency to present infertility as her 
physiological problem, not his. In their study designed to explore how men understand 
and engage with IVF, Throsby and Gill found that,  
 
[F]or men, the inability to conceive with their parner also produces an additional and 
gender-specific set of difficulties associated with a perceived threat to their 
masculinity... [I]t is a consequence of a strong popular association between male 
fertility, potency and masculinity. In finding themselves unable to make their partners 
pregnant (for whatever reason), men felt that their sense of themselves as men was 
called into question.88  
 
A striking feature of the research around masculinity, reproductivity, and infertility, 
is that while men’s feelings about the inability to conceive corresponds to a large 
degree with how women conceptualise that loss, the manner by which women and 
men exhibit and respond to that loss differs in marked ways. Recent research 
highlights that although infertility constitutes a major life event for both men and 
women, men are less likely to ‘express emotional distress’.89 This latter aspect, in 
particular, has posed a variety of challenges in respect of efforts to gain insights into 
the impact of infertility upon men. Not only are there considerable logistical and 
methodological challenges in including (and recruiting) men in infertility research90  
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but also interpretative challenges in identifying men’s psycho-social experiences. The 
operation of (out-dated) gender stereotyping in empirical research around male 
infertility looms hard here, raising significant questions over past claims to the effect 
that women suffer more adverse reactions to infertility than men.91  As Webb and 
Daniluk note, while there is a significant body of research and clinical literature which 
maps the considerable psychosocial distress of women in relation to the inability to 
conceive, this has led ‘many clinicians to suggest that fatherhood is a less significant 
role in the lives of men, and as such, men are less invested in the outcome of infertility 
investigations and treatments’.92 While ‘distress’ is recognised by sociologists as a 
social construct, tied to social norms, personal and social expectations as well as 
cultural understandings so that distress manifests itself in different forms and different 
cultural settings, the danger to which researchers are now alert is that research has 
been more sensitised to the (well-investigated) ways that women experience and 
express distress.93  
 
Despite the historical neglect of men in reproduction research,94 a growing body of 
scholarship exploring the particular ways that men respond to the experience of 
infertility, and what this symbolises, leaves us in no doubt that the lost prospect of 
fatherhood constitutes a profound loss for many. Earlier critical engagements with the 
emotional and psychological aspects of male infertility, such as Mary-Claire Mason’s 
Male Infertility – Men Talking have proved powerful for debunking ideas of men’s 
ambivalence to their reproductive futures. Offering often touching first hand accounts 
from men, her pathbreaking study illustrates that for all of her subjects male infertility 
was regarded as a problem even if their experiences ‘varied enormously’,  
 
I found out I was producing no sperm in 1987. For the first few days I think I was 
numb, going through the motions, going to work and somehow getting through the 
day. I worried about a future without children and felt anxious about what my wife 
would feel about my infertility. I was frightened of growing old without children, and 
then I started to think that [donor insemination] might be forced on me. The next 
stage was going through wild swings of emotion. One minute I would be very positive 
thinking my infertility was a challenge I would overcome, then I would slump into 
depression. It was very important that nobody found out, I couldn’t have coped with 
that .95 
 
Assessing what what is ‘lost’ through infertility proves to be complex. The desire for 
children is rarely clearly articulated or attended by concrete reasons. For many, 
fatherhood constitutes an ‘inevitable and logical step’ for men, ‘a normal thing to 
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do’,96 ‘natural’, ‘taken-for-granted’,97 ‘the most important thing in life’ or ‘essential 
to a full and complete life’.98 For many, the possibility of being able to father in the 
future seems important. Men’s responses to a diagnosis of infertility, as Mason had 
found depended on a ‘huge list of factors’ such as type of diagnosis and past personal 
history, so that men saw the problem ‘differently, reacted to and coped with it in 
diverse ways’.99 While men, like women, experience non-transitional events such as 
infertility differently, for some it thrusts them into ‘a personal and existential crisis’, 
challenging ‘basic assumptions regarding justice, fairness and the meaning of life’.100 
While many men approach adulthood with the expectation of eventually becoming a 
parent, the news of infertility can be identified as multi-faceted in terms of ‘the loss 
of fertility, the loss of genetic continuity, the loss of a life dream, the loss of 
masculinity, the loss of control, and the loss of meaning in life’.101  While fertility may 
be an assumption for men, the news of infertility can be experienced as a ‘bomb-
shell’; unlike women, men do not have continual reminders of their reproductive 
potential or indeed warning signs as to problems through menstruation and changes 
in one’s cycle.102 Moreover, infertility is often experienced in a relational context, 
whether referring to a future possible partner, or a current one. For men in 
partnerships, the news of their fertility can foster feelings of inadequacy, betrayal and 
isolation. While men might manage their sense of loss in ways their partners could 
not understand or identify with, infertility could become the source of interpersonal 
conflict, with ‘misunderstandings, resentment and dissatisfaction’.103 Over time, some 
men experience a ‘powerful sense of threat and foreboding’ where infertility threatens 
the ‘very essence of all that he had held as secure’, 
 
The men had mapped out their lives, and now everything had changed. They had no 
clear sense of how to construct a future and no idea of what the future might hold. In 
particular they feared that they might lose not only the biological children they had 
hoped for but the woman they loved and hoped to have children with. These feelings 
were sometimes debilitating and left the man unable to make decisions about 
alternative parenting options such as adoption or donor insemination. As one 
participant stated, “I can’t believe some of the things I said... I was to the point where 
I was almost encouraging [my wife] to have an affair and don’t tell me about it” to 
avoid having to make a decision.104  
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The consequences of infertility then, situate themselves heavily at psycho-social and 
relational level and can permeate every area of one’s life. As Mason explains one 
reason for this ripple effect may be that the goal ‘of parenthood is linked to other ones 
such as being a worthwhile member of society. Failure to become a father may mean 
the other goals seem unattainable and the person starts to feel worthless’.105 From an 
individual’s self-perception, their relations with others including their partner, 
performance at work and levels of psychological health, the impact of infertility and 
an individual’s ability to cope with or move beyond infertility are variable, highly 
dependent on personality, context and personal biography.  
 
The foregoing, while crudely drawing out aspects of a developing research domain 
around men’s experience of infertility, illustrates how the vehicle of property 
deployed in Yearworth renders an impoverished representation of the nature of the 
harm sustained by individuals whose hopes for fatherhood had been frustrated. In 
some respects, one could venture that the circumstances of Yearworth suggest a more 
pronounced loss for those whose fertility did not return, in light of the active steps 
taken (and typically encouraged by NHS providers in those diagnosed and treated for 
cancer106) to preserve the possibility of genetic fatherhood. What should be painfully 
clear, is that the significance of these experiences is diminished when conceptualised 
as an abstract idea of property had and lost, of physical hurts or pains. Rather, the only 
means of understanding the meaning of destroyed sperm in Yearworth is in the 
destruction of an open horizon which made these men’s lives make sense. This gives 
social meaning, and an explanation as to why courts might treat these experiences as 
ones which leave the men ‘appreciably worse off’, rather than sustaining harms that 
are trivial or momentary at the point that property sperm is destroyed. True it is that 
for some of the Yearworth claimants their fertility returned, however, a property 
damage analysis poorly equips the courts to evaluate how to treat these claims as 
distinct from those where men are rendered infertile. The effects as part of the broader 
biography of harms that have been sustained gives flesh to damage. At the heart of 
the problem lies the concept of damage, whether expressed as personal injury or 
property, which simply renders irrelevant the psycho-social and practical factors 
which seem so crucial to an enquiry in assessing whether individuals are left 
appreciably worse off. It is this enquiry which provides the critical normative marker 
for establishing whether the tipping point for harms that should make the legal cut 
(whether ‘seriousness’ or being left ‘appreciably worse off’) has been demonstrated. 
 
At this stage, some readers may be sceptical; though it may be true that these psycho-
social aspects of harm are suffered, and that valuably fleshes out questions of damage, 
what difference does such an enquiry really make? After all, was it not the case that 
the Court of Appeal was practically falling over itself to accommodate the harms 
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suffered here within the concept of damage? This would be a fair comment. Given the 
narrow remit of the notion of ‘personal injury’, the adoption of a property rationale in 
Yearworth to claimants who were not physically harmed per se, is perhaps 
understandable. The Court of Appeal was evidently keen to afford some recognition 
of the wrong done and the outcome harm that resulted. Even Heather Widdows, who 
harboured grave concerns about the implications of assigning a property label to 
human reproductive materials and the appropriateness of compensation in such 
instances, conceded that, given the men’s distress, and the obvious wrong committed, 
compensation at least recognises that, ‘[an] injustice has occurred’ and that ‘as the 
only form of recognition, this is better than none’.107 Some might argue that as a matter 
of common sense, these men seem obviously harmed. On that basis, the kind of 
enquiry we have just conducted in exploring some of the psycho-social aspects as to 
how and in what way these men may have suffered harm as a means of determining 
‘real damage’ might seem superfluous or excessive given that the court nevertheless 
arrived at the ‘right’ result.   
 
However, what needs emphasising here is just how haphazard and arbitrary ideas of 
‘obviousness of injury’ and locating the ‘right result’ can be in the tort of negligence. 
Had the Court of Appeal denied this claim, akin to the County Court, this would have 
been equally unsurprising.  If we think back to our exploration of the response of the 
courts to whether asymptomatic plural plaques constitute actionable damage (or 
indeed ‘injury’), the progression of the Rothwell litigation highlights the production 
of very different judicial responses; so too, in the wider UK sphere, do we now see 
contrasting approaches to the question as to whether pleural plaques constitute 
damage or not.  Ideas of obviousness or ‘common sense’ then, do not take us far. So 
too, can the same be said by reference to the courts’ approach to the question of 
whether the harm of raising and maintaining an unwanted but healthy children should 
be deemed actionable. What is obvious to one person, or indeed, to one commuter on 
the underground, may not be to another. For those who know what is involved in the 
care of a child, the prospect of caring for an unwanted child after a failed sterilisation 
may be regarded as ‘obviously’ harmful; for others who believe that parenthood 
merely entails writing cheques, the harm suffered may be far less evident.   
 
Yet, if we rise above the particularities of these cases and endeavour to explore the 
potential commonalities between them, this invites a different critique. If we care 
about horizontal equity between victims, in the sense of treating like cases alike, there 
is no reason for distinguishing between cases like McFarlane or Yearworth. Though 
the particular circumstances and impacts will differ in the sense of reproductive labour 
being thrust upon a claimant versus hopes for a genetically-related child being swept 
away from another, these cases are closely bound together in the messing up of one’s 
life plans in often profound ways. They both manifest essentially the same kind of 
harm, notably the frustration of reproductive plans that made these claimants’ lives, 
make sense. This should be the principle gateway for evaluating how and in what ways 
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one’s life plans have been disrupted. The significance of the freedom to make plans 
concerning reproduction lies in its instrumental relationship with a far broader series 
of interests which form the architecture of our lives and it is against that, which an 
evaluation of damage needs to be judged. In this sense then, the potentially corrosive 
effects on any individual’s life through the thwarting of reproductive plans, should 
make it impossible to suggest that decisions to reproduce are more or less important 
than ‘decisions to avoid reproduction’.108 Yet, the overall picture presented is that the 
law is willing to protect the interests of those who wish to have children over those 
who take steps to avoid that outcome; a conclusion which seemed so obvious to the 
House of Lords in McFarlane in declaring the pursuers to have been blessed by 
parental responsibility, rather than harmed by it, despite taking invasive steps to avoid 
that very blessing. Either way, the point to be made here is that while neither 
‘obviousness’ or ‘common sense’ will be able to safely guide us to the ‘right result’, 
they nevertheless play a large role in determinations of what is, what is not damage.  
 
The foregoing illustrates how the harm entailed in the frustration of reproductive plans 
is so poorly captured by the analytical concepts that negligence possesses for 
addressing issues of actionability and compensation for injury. One never gets the 
sense as to why destroyed sperm, or an unwanted child, is really harmful – the enquiry 
never extends beyond the assumption that these events were simply undesired. There 
is no evaluation attending the concept of damage to measure even crudely whether 
these harms are trivial, deleterious, or perhaps catastrophic to the claimants. In this 
respect the damage enquiry and the courts’ mode of analysis is painfully divorced 
from and disinterested in, social reality. The critical characteristics that serve to 
transform bodies into persons, those aspects of “us”, that prove so central to the 
meaning of who we are and our capacity to value life: our subjectivity, emotionality, 
relationality, personality, capacity to love/care and the possession of aspirations and 
wishes – are treated as quite irrelevant aspects of humanity in determining when and 
whether damage has been sustained capable of triggering an actionable claim.109  So 
too are red flag factors critical to issues of fairness before the law, around gender and 
equality, missed resulting in a damage concept that reflects and perpetuates outdated 
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stereotypes of men and women’s roles in reproduction and family rather than 
challenging them. It is in this sense that by virtue of all that the concept of damage 
misses, that it proves to be damaging. The most significant aspects of what it means 
to be human, for the greater part, are relegated to “legal junk” for the purposes of 
locating damage. Why this should be seen as problematic goes far beyond aspirations 
for the law to reflect ‘who we are’ in a strictly presentational sense; rather, it strikes 
at the heart of a far more pressing issue: analytical inclusiveness.  
Conclusion: Psycho-Social Harm at the Edge of Time  
Irrespective of whatever ideals and aspirations we hold the tort of negligence up to, 
its particular method of achieving what it achieves, is incrementalism. Case by case, 
a whole host of distinctive scenarios have come before the courts so as to foster the 
growth of the tort of negligence into the super-size tort it is today. During the passage 
of its life course, one can of course spot points where its boundaries have been guarded 
vigorously with different ends or fears in sight, nevertheless the overall trend is one 
of growth resulting in a tort that speaks to broad range of liability situations which a 
century ago would have been unthinkable. Nevertheless, while incrementalism 
constitutes an inherent part of the negligence enterprise, there is good reason for 
questioning the techniques and indeed the normative ‘vision’ that guide the growth of 
new liability situations (or indeed, the opposite). ‘Growth’ in and of itself cannot be 
taken as ‘the’ good; nor for that matter can maintaining the status quo so as to 
ruthlessly preserve existing boundaries at all costs, be seen as an intrinsic good. Rather 
there is a fair expectation that the tort of negligence is connected to the facilitation of 
broader social goals, responsive to the social settings to which negligence has 
purchase and that these considerations help in no small measure to steer the path of 
the law. It is with these very concerns in mind that this article has centralised the 
concept of damage. The aim has been to explore the extent to which that connection 
is evident, and the extent to which one can say that the boundaries of what constitutes 
actionable harm are being drawn by reference to any higher principle at all.  
 
In so many respects, that socio-legal connection proves critical for the life of 
negligence and it proves especially germane in the context of our discussion around 
damage. In the context of the broader theorising around the concept of harm, weighty 
arguments have been presented to highlight how often the pockets of resistance to 
extending the tort of negligence, for instance in the case of harms that women sustain 
as women, have offended core ideals of fairness before the law and indeed the 
aspiration to treat like cases are treated alike. But so too, is there an argument in 
respect of the relevance of negligence which underpins the need for a concept of 
damage that remains open and fluid. Insofar as what is considered harmful in our 
‘everyday’ lives refreshes with new generations, agitated by changing social, 
technological and indeed, clinical norms, by developments in what is possible and 
knowable, and in different spheres expected in our professional and social realms, in 
similar force the concept of damage needs to remain somewhat fluid to retain its 
purchase. Yet these two ideas, of the fairness of negligence and its relevance as an at 
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least partial tool of governance, both depend on a very specific kind of careful 
incrementalism which this article has argued, seems incredibly lacking. As I have 
sought to highlight, at least on the basis of these second generation ‘hybrid damage’ 
cases, the concept of damage is currently masquerading as a normative category. In 
part this is by virtue of its centralisation of corporeal harm, and its neglect of the 
psycho-social aspects of injury; it is the latter which not only makes conceptions of 
‘damage’ meaningful and worthwhile, but tells us what kinds of experiences prove to 
leave us ‘appreciably worse off’ or are the most ‘serious’. It is in this sense that some 
account needs to be made of ‘the ways in which we value the living physical body as 
it enables our being in the world and our interactions with others’.110 The point is this: 
it is that “stuff”, the embodied vision of ourselves that often proves to be so irrelevant 
to the current analytical enquiry in negligence law, which is utterly critical in 
adjudging from a socio-normative perspective, whether serious harm has occurred and 
whether the law should seek to vigorously protect the interests that harm has 
frustrated.  
 
As we have seen in the context of the above cases, it is clear that the law deeply 
misrepresents the experience of reproductivity, reproductive labour and the emotional 
and practical experience of having one’s expectations frustrated. Contrary to the story 
that law tells and the picture it presents, an enquiry into these dimensions tells us that 
these are not trifling or harmless injuries. The consequences of one’s reproductive 
expectations had and lost can have a corrosive impact upon victims and the 
consequences and experience of frustrated reproductive plans look every bit as 
harmful and disruptive (and often, perhaps more so) as the suffering of many strictly 
physical injuries, whether whiplash or other short-lived bodily harms, that negligence 
regards as unproblematic.111  Arguably then, to not include these other kinds of harm 
which fail to fit a strictly physical paradigm seems to send out pernicious and 
unsupportable messages about what harms we should be willing to privately tolerate 
for being simply the ‘vicissitudes of life’ rather than serious harms warranting 
negligence’s attention and a remedy.  
 
Such an argument is strongly supported by reference to equity and fairness before the 
law.112 For example, too often the harms that women sustain as women, have fallen 
into the ‘vicissitudes’ category as is demonstrated by the slow recognition of mental 
disturbance as a legally cognisable harm, or indeed, more recently, as explored above, 
through the scaling back of meaningful compensation for parents of unwanted 
children born as a result of negligence in family planning procedures. That tort fails 
to ‘see’ many of the injuries that women sustain as women - of reproductivity, 
pregnancy, childbirth and the emotional and life capital lost through caring for a child 
that one had planned not to have - is deeply embedded within the analytical categories 
                                                          
110
 Fletcher, Fox and McCandless (note 3), 321.  
111
 Priaulx (note 42). 
112
 Although note that a broader exploration of equity and fairness might well point in a different direction; 
see further Priaulx (note 42).  
  
 
34 
 
that control liability. These categories are not objective but require ‘substantive 
choices to be made about which claimed injuries it will remedy.’113 As such, because 
categories such as damage reflect a choice as to which aspects of human social life 
should be treated as injurious, we need to be watchful as to which, and more 
particularly, whose social experiences it picks up. As Joanne Conaghan comments,  
 
[I]njury has a social as well as an individual dimension: people suffer harm not just 
because they are individuals but also because they are part of a particular class, group, 
race or gender. Moreover, their membership of that particular class, group, race or 
gender can significantly shape the nature and degree of the harm they sustain. The 
problem with law then is its failure to recognize that social dimension. Consequently, 
and in the context of gendered harms, it fails to offer proper redress.114  
 
In this respect then, we see that when important aspects of our biographical experience 
are missed, law lacks insight into the specific ways that injury and harm occur, as well 
as the conditions which generate them. Under such circumstances, tort will proceed 
as if the experiences which harm and injure us are simply part of the normal (rather 
than injured) life course. For example, it is only since the late 1970s that sexual 
harassment has been transformed from behaviour widely regarded as a ‘harmless’ part 
of normal human engagement to behaviour constituting sex discrimination, deserving 
of a legal response.115  And it is important here to recognise how these analytical 
categories can march on for decades whilst failing to speak to the experiences of 
classes and populations of people to whom it officially purports to apply to. In the 
context of emotional harms, as Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggens argue, while 
the traditional justification was that the law was directed at protecting material 
interests and physical harm, leaving emotions and relationships beyond legal 
protection, this ‘basic demarcation line had important gender implications for 
compensation’,  
 
[L]osses typically suffered by men were often associated with the more highly-valued 
physical realm, whilst losses typically suffered by women were relegated to the 
lower-valued realm of the emotional or relational.116  
 
Of course, that this privileging of physical harm over emotional harm ‘persists to this 
day’117 has been central to this paper. And what I hope to have shown is that a concern 
for negligence law to reflect important aspects of our humanity is more than a wish 
for inclusive symbolism. The question of biographical inclusiveness has serious 
repercussions in relation to which injuries, and indeed very often, whose injuries are 
addressed by tort. While a vast body of feminist literature has noted the manner by 
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which law has excluded those experiences and risks which either exclusively, or more 
frequently pertain to the biographical experience of being a woman,118 the present 
analysis has also sought to illustrate is that it is not only for women that the privileging 
of the physical over the emotional has been problematic. The absence of an emotional 
and social dialogue within negligence has also rendered a fictitious and problematic 
portrayal of losses and harms sustained by men too. Rather than being conceptualised 
as emotional creatures whose reproductive materials signify lost and frustrated 
futures, the beings of Yearworth are ‘sperm owners’, whose psychological response 
constitutes an afterthought – it is limited to and triggered as a result of carelessly 
destroyed property. An exploration of the psycho-social aspects of injury and loss 
clearly reveals some fundamental problems that underpin the assumptions around 
what can and should count as actionable harm. Certainly the Court of Appeal’s 
assessment of the Yearworth case is impoverished in ascertaining the nature and the 
quality of the injury (but we can sceptically note that while the normative questions 
around why this should count as damage are missing, it did, nevertheless allow the 
claims to proceed), just as the same kind of enquiry in relation to the psycho-social 
and practical aspects of caring for a wrongfully conceived child makes it incredibly 
hard to conclude that claimants’ are unharmed or are better off than those who sustain 
a ‘physical’ injury. Given the repercussions for wrongful conception claimants, on 
their lives, freedom and broader interests, we may well find that the psycho-social and 
practical dimensions of their injuries places them generally in a worse position than 
those whose injuries consist of physical hurts.119  
 
What path then, would the author advocate that the law of negligence and the judiciary 
as its gatekeepers, follow? This is a somewhat harder question and I hope that the 
reader will forgive what appears to be some ambivalence on this point. The urge to 
compel the law of negligence to embrace a wider ambit of harms under its cloak, tugs 
hard here. Modifying the concepts of injury and damage so that they are more in line 
with the lived experience of human injury would go a long way toward making the 
damage enquiry more normatively meaningful, and indeed, more coherent, inclusive 
and morally robust to meet new challenges and a changing social landscape. 
Moreover, accommodating these broader harms would seem to entail rather minor 
revisions to existing law, for as Christian Witting has already noted in relation to cases 
of wrongful conception, the kind of damage featured there is, ‘so closely analogous 
to orthodox kind of damage that one would be splitting hairs to attempt to draw a line 
between them’.120 Such expansionism undoubtedly provides a legitimate response 
given that it is motivated by a genuine desire to address some of the serious shortfalls 
in the operation of the negligence ideal in its management of human harm; indeed, it 
is an approach that this author has advocated in the past.121 Nevertheless, the process 
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of incrementally revising negligence to reflect our humanity in the ways in which we 
experience injury, whether on the grounds of equality, justice, or coherence, while a 
common strategy for smoothing out disparities within the law of negligence, is one 
approach – and it is one driven by legal egalitarian ends. But perhaps viewed through 
a slightly wider lens, a different response is possible. It may be that incrementalism 
plays into a habit of offering a short-lived and impoverished kind of gain for society 
when we consider quite practical aspects of how the law of negligence operates on the 
broader social landscape. Indeed regarded in this way, a more detailed investigation 
into some of the foundational assumptions of the concept of damage and in particular 
the ‘physical’ gold standard that underpins it might well bring more closely into view 
the reparative limits of negligence in attaining the kinds of solutions we had hoped 
for.122   
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